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I INTRODUCTION 
On 22 October 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court (‘the Court’) rendered 
an historical judgment1 about the constitutional legitimacy of the Italian 
legislation that has been adopted in order to implement the decision of the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
case (‘Jurisdictional Immunities’).2 According to the Court, Italian judges’ duty 
to deny their jurisdiction in trials relating to damages caused by Nazi crimes is 
unconstitutional because it prevents the victims’ next of kin from obtaining 
access to justice. In order to overcome this obstacle, the Court declared that:  
                                                 
 1 Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 238, 22 October 2014. 
 2 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (Judgment) 
[2012] ICJ Rep 100 (‘Jurisdictional Immunities’). See also Annalisa Ciampi, ‘The 
International Court of Justice between “Reason of State” and Demands for Justice by 
Victims of Serious International Crimes’ (2012) 95 Rivista di diritto internazionale 374; 
Benedetto Conforti, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Immunity of 
Foreign States: A Missed Opportunity’ (2011) 21 Italian Yearbook of International Law 
135; Lorenzo Gradoni and Attila Tanzi, ‘Immunità dello Stato e crimini internazionali tra 
consuetudine e bilanciamento: note critiche a margine della sentenza della Corte 
Internazionale di Giustizia del 3 febbraio 2012’ (2012) 67 La Comunità internazionale 203; 
Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, ‘La sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia relativa al 
caso Germania c Italia: profili di diritto intertemporale’ (2012) 6 Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale 335; Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Il rapporto fra norme di ius cogens e la 
regola sull’immunità degli Stati: alcune osservazioni critiche sulla sentenza della Corte 
internazionale di giustizia del 3 febbraio 2012’ (2012) 6 Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale 310; Kimberley N Trapp and Alex Mills, ‘Smooth Runs the Water Where the 
Brook Is Deep: The Obscured Complexities of Germany v Italy’ (2012) 1 Cambridge 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 153; Nerina Boschiero, ‘Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State and Exequatur of Foreign Judgments: A Private International Law 
Evaluation of the Recent ICJ Judgment in Germany v Italy’ in Nerina Boschiero et al (eds), 
International Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio 
Treves (TMC Asser Press, 2013) 781. 
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(i) The Italian legal system refuses to implement the international 
customary rule regarding state immunity at a domestic level when it 
is invoked in a trial concerning international crimes; 
(ii) Article 1 of Italian Law No 848 of 17 August 1957 (‘Law 
No 848/1957’)3 is unconstitutional, so far as it concerns the 
execution of art 94 of the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN 
Charter’),4 to the extent that it obliges the Italian judge to comply 
with the Jurisdictional Immunities decision; and 
(iii) Article 3 of Italian Law No 5 of 14 January 2013 (‘Law No 
5/2013’),5 which specifically obliges judges to deny their jurisdiction 
in order to implement the ICJ’s judgment, is unconstitutional and, 
consequently, null and void.6  
The Court strongly affirmed that access to justice is a fundamental right, 
protected by the Italian Constitution, which cannot be derogated from. 
Consequently, when state immunity is invoked not to protect typical sovereign 
functions, but to prevent the justiciability of international crimes, access to 
justice cannot be sacrificed to state immunity. 
Decision No 238, because it creates contradictions between domestic and 
international law, will be at the centre of an animated debate among scholars and 
practitioners. The Italian Government and judges are now obliged to implement 
the Court’s judgment, despite the fact that such implementation violates the ICJ’s 
decision and the rules of international law there outlined. Moreover, Germany 
could start a new proceeding against Italy on the grounds that the Court’s 
judgment denies Germany state immunity. Alternatively, Germany could defer 
the matter to the UN Security Council, which in turn could decide to enforce the 
ICJ’s decision against Italy on the basis of art 94 of the UN Charter.7 
This case note will examine the Court’s judgment and emphasise its rationale, 
which is based on a strong human rights approach. In doing so, it will attempt to 
                                                 
 3 Esecuzione dello Statuto delle Nazione Unite [Execution of the Charter of the United 
Nations] (Italy) Law No 848, 17 August 1957, art 1. 
 4 Charter of the United Nations art 94. 
 5 Adesione della Repubblica italiana alla Convenzione della Nazioni Unite sulle immunità 
giurisdizionali degli Stati e dei loro beni, fatta a New York il 2 dicembre 2004 [Accession by 
the Italian Republic to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property] (Italy) Law No 5, 14 January 2013, art 3 (‘Law No 5/2013’). 
 6 Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 238, 22 October 2014, dispositif. 
 7 See generally Attila Tanzi, ‘Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International 
Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations’ (1995) 6 European Journal of 
International Law 539; Alain Pillepich, ‘Article 94’ in Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet and 
Mathias Forteau (eds), La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article 
(Economica, 3rd ed, 2005) vol 2, 1987. For a commentary on the possible reactions of 
Germany after the Italian decision, see Lorenzo Gradoni, ‘Corte costituzionale italiana 
“controvento” sull’immunità giurisdizionale degli Stati stranieri?’ (2014) Quaderni 
costituzionali 905. 
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limit as much as possible any references to the Italian domestic legal system and 
the subtleties of the constitutional control mechanism.8 
II THE COMPLEX HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN JURISPRUDENTIAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO STATE IMMUNITY 
The Court’s judgment can be seen as the last word in a very long and 
problematic legal story. For the purposes of this essay, the decision of the Corte 
di cassazione [Italian Supreme Court] (‘Supreme Court’) in Ferrini v Germany9 
(‘Ferrini’) is taken as the starting point of the story. In Ferrini, the Supreme 
Court denied state immunity to Germany for the crimes committed by the Nazi 
army in the north of Italy during World War II; these crimes consisted of illegal 
deportations and denials of the status of war prisoners. According to the Supreme 
Court, these actions amount to serious violations of jus cogens norms. 
Consequently the Supreme Court held that, since the rule on state immunity is 
not peremptory, it could not be invoked by Germany.10 The ICJ rejected this idea 
in a case pursued by Germany against Italy, which was based on Ferrini and 
similar decisions.11 The ICJ emphasised that there is no relationship between the 
procedural rule on state immunity and the international norms violated in 
concreto:  
The Court concludes that, under customary international law as it presently 
stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused 
of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of 
armed conflict.12 
The ICJ’s decision was followed by a number of other Italian judgments, both 
of the Supreme Court and of lesser tribunals, recognising the international 
                                                 
 8 For some early comments on this point, see Lorenzo Gradoni, ‘Giudizi costituzionali del 
quinto tipo: Ancora sulla storica sentenza della Corte costituzionale italiana’ on Società 
Italiana di Diritto Internazionale, SIDIBlog (10 November 2014) <http://www. 
sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1135>; Antonio Ruggeri, ‘La Corte aziona l’arma dei “controlimiti” 
e, facendo un uso alquanto singolare delle categorie processuali, sbarra le porte all’ingresso 
in ambito interno di norma internazionale consuetudinaria (a margine di Corte cost n 238 
del 2004)’ (Research Paper, Consulta Online, 17 November 2014) 
<http://www.giurcost.org/studi/ruggeri42.pdf>. 
 9 Corte di cassazione [Italian Supreme Court], No 5044, 11 March 2004, reprinted in (2004) 
87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 539. 
 10 Ibid. For a commentary, see Alessandra Gianelli, ‘Crimini internazionali ed immunità degli 
Stati dalla giurisdizione nella Sentenza Ferrini’ (2004) 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 
643; Massimo Iovane, ‘The Ferrini Judgment of the Italian Supreme Court: Opening Up 
Domestic Courts to Claims of Reparation for Victims of Serious Violations of Fundamental 
Human Rights’ (2004) 14 Italian Yearbook of International Law 165; Andrea Bianchi, 
‘Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 
242; Pasquale De Sena and Francesca De Vittor, ‘State Immunity and Human Rights: The 
Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case’ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 89; Carlo Focarelli, ‘Denying Foreign State Immunity for Commission of 
International Crimes: The Ferrini Decision’ (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 951; Andrea Gattini, ‘War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini Decision’ 
(2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 224.  
 11 See, eg, Corte di cassazione [Italian Supreme Court], No 1072, 13 January 2009, reprinted 
in (2009) 92 Rivista di diritto internazionale 618. 
 12 Jurisdictional Immunities [2012] ICJ Rep 100, 139 [91]. 
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decision and denying Italian courts jurisdiction in similar cases.13 The Italian 
Parliament also intervened, by adopting Law No 5/2013,14 with which Italy 
acceded to the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property (‘UN State Immunity Convention’).15 Article 3 of Law No 
5/2013 stated that Italian judges had to comply with the ICJ judgment, denying 
them jurisdiction to hear similar cases or to reopen trials in which they had 
affirmed the judgment: 
[W]here the International Court of Justice, in a judgment settling a dispute in 
which Italy is a party, excluded the possibility of subjecting a specific conduct of 
another State to civil jurisdiction, the judge hearing the case, ex officio and even 
where he has already passed a decision which is not final but has the effect of res 
judicata with regard to the existence of jurisdiction, shall ascertain the lack of 
jurisdiction in every stage and instance of the proceeding … Decisions 
constituting res judicata contrary to the above mentioned ICJ judgments, even 
where the latter have been passed subsequently, can be reconsidered not only in 
the cases provided by Article 395 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure 
[‘Revocazione’], but also due to lack of civil jurisdiction. In such circumstances 
Article 396 of Italian Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply.16 
At the same time, the Italian Government attached an interpretative 
declaration to the UN State Immunity Convention. According to this declaration, 
no article of the treaty could be interpreted as denying state immunity for acts of 
armed forces: 
Italy states its understanding that the Convention does not apply to the activities 
of armed forces and their personnel, whether carried out during an armed conflict 
as defined by international humanitarian law, or undertaken in the exercise of 
their official duties.17 
This declaration clearly demonstrated the willingness of the Italian 
Government to comply with the ICJ’s decision. Although Italian judges were 
                                                 
 13 See Corte di cassazione [Italian Supreme Court], No 32139, 9 August 2012, reprinted in 
(2012) 95 Rivista di diritto internazionale 1196; Corte di cassazione [Italian Supreme 
Court], No 1136, 12 November 2013. For a survey of these decisions, see Giuseppe Nesi, 
‘The Quest for a “Full” Execution of the ICJ Judgment in Germany v Italy’ (2013) 11 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 185, 188. 
 14 Law No 5/2013 art 3. 
 15 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, GA 
Res 59/38, UN GAOR, 59th sess, 65th plen mtg, Agenda Item 142, UN Doc A/RES/59/38 
(16 December 2004) annex. For a commentary, see Eileen Denza, ‘The 2005 UN 
Convention on State Immunity in Perspective’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 395; Francesca De Vittor, ‘Recenti sviluppi in tema di immunità degli Stati 
dalla giurisdizione: la Convenzione di New York del 2 dicembre 2004’ in Alessandra 
Lanciotti and Attila Tanzi (eds), Le immunità nel diritto internazionale: Temi scelti 
(Giappichelli, 2007) 153. 
 16 Law No 5/2013 art 3. The English translation of this paragraph has been quoted from Fulvio 
Maria Palombino, ‘Italy’s Compliance with ICJ Decisions vs Constitutional Guarantees: 
Does the “Counter-Limits” Doctrine Matter?’ (2012) 22 Italian Yearbook of International 
Law 187, 197. 
 17 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004) United  
Nations Treaty Collection <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src 
=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en>. 
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already under the duty to implement the ICJ’s ruling even without a specific new 
domestic legislation, art 3 of Law No 5/2013 should be read in this context.18 
The ICJ’s ruling on this matter also affected other national and international 
decisions, such as the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Jones v 
United Kingdom.19 For this reason, some scholars believed that the last word 
about the relationship between state immunity and access to justice and 
reparation had been had, even if the ICJ’s judgment had not convinced many 
observers.20 On the other hand, other scholars thought that the Italian 
Constitutional Court could have some role to play due to its commitment to the 
protection of human beings.21 This latter position has been shown to be correct, 
as will be explained soon. 
III THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S DECISION NO 238 REGARDING THE 
CUSTOMARY NORM OF STATE IMMUNITY 
The Court rendered a decision about the compatibility of the state immunity 
rule and the Italian legislation implementing the ICJ’s ruling when the Tribunal 
                                                 
 18 See Mirko Sossai, ‘Are Italian Courts Directly Bound to Give Effect to the Jurisdictional 
Immunities Judgment?’ (2011) 21 Italian Yearbook of International Law 175, 182; Maria 
Luisa Padelletti, ‘L’esecuzione della sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia sulle 
immunità dalla giurisdizione nel caso Germania c Italia: una strada in salita?’ (2012) 95 
Rivista di diritto internazionale 444, 445–6; Annalisa Ciampi, ‘L’Italia attua la sentenza 
della Corte internazionale di giustizia nel caso Germania c Italia’ (2013) 96 Rivista di 
diritto internazionale 146, 147. 
 19 Jones v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Trial Chamber, Application 
Nos 34356/06 and 40528/06, 14 January 2014). For some early comments, see Riccardo 
Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘Le immunità degli Stati e degli organi statali precludono l’accesso alla 
giustizia anche alle vittime di torture: il caso Jones dinanzi alla Corte europea dei diritti 
umani’ (2014) 8 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 215; Philippa Webb, ‘Jones v UK: 
The Re-integration of State and Official Immunity?’ on European Journal of International 
Law, EJIL: Talk! (14 January 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-the-re-integration 
-of-state-and-official-immunity/>; Lorna McGregor, ‘Jones v UK: A Disappointing End’ on 
European Journal of International Law, EJIL: Talk! (16 January 2014) 
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-a-disappointing-end/>; Micaela Frulli, ‘Jones v UK: On 
Analogies and Inconsistencies in the Application of Immunity Rules’ on European Journal 
of International Law, EJIL: Talk! (21 January 2014) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-on 
-analogies-and-inconsistencies-in-the-application-of-immunity-rules/>. For a survey of the 
European Court of Human Rights case law before this decision, see Marcella Distefano, 
‘Immunità degli Stati e art 6 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo: coerenza 
sistemica e garanzie di non impunità’ in Alessandra Lanciotti and Attila Tanzi (eds), Le 
immunità nel diritto internazionale: Temi scelti (Giappichelli, 2007) 117; Alessandra 
Lanciotti and Antonio Panetta, ‘L’immunità dello Stato straniero dalla giurisdizione e il 
diritto dell’individuo di accesso alla giustizia per violazione dei suoi diritti fondamentali’ in 
Luisa Cassetti (ed), Diritti, principi e garanzie sotto la lente dei giudici di Strasburgo 
(Jovene, 2012) 335. 
 20 See Andrea Bianchi, ‘Il tempio e i suoi sacerdoti: Considerazioni su retorica e diritto a 
margine del caso Germania c Italia’ (2012) 6 Diritti umani e diritto internazionale 293, 
307; Andrea Bianchi, ‘On Certainty’ on European Journal of International Law, EJIL: Talk! 
(16 February 2012) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/on-certainty/>. 
 21 See Natalino Ronzitti, ‘L’Italia nel sottoporre a giudizio la Germania ha violato l’immunità 
giurisdizionale degli Stati’, Guida al diritto (Milan), 10 March 2012, 93; Benedetto 
Conforti, Diritto internazionale (Editoriale Scientifica, 10th ed, 2014) 349. 
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of Florence,22 dealing with three civil proceedings commenced by the next of kin 
of previous victims, requested a judgment on this matter from the Court. In Italy, 
only the Constitutional Court can declare that a law is not constitutional, and 
such decisions create obligations for all the organs of the state. A decision of the 
Court on the constitutional legitimacy of a law can be triggered in two ways: the 
national or regional governments can directly ask the Court for a judgment, or 
individual citizens can request such a decision during a trial in which the norm 
that is suspected of being unconstitutional would be applied by a judge.23 
In the present case, the Court first ruled on the general framework of the 
implementation of the state immunity rule in the Italian legal system. Obviously, 
apart from the Italian accession to the UN State Immunity Convention, the state 
immunity rule is part of customary international law,24 and therefore the Court 
had to reflect on the Italian mechanism of implementing customary rules. 
According to art 10(1) of the Italian Constitution, ‘[t]he Italian legal system 
conforms to the generally recognised rules of international law’.25 Constitutional 
jurisprudence has previously clarified that this expression refers to international 
customary rules in general, but excludes international treaties.26 
                                                 
 22 The Tribunal of Florence issued three ordinances on this issue, with identical content. See 
Tribunale di Firenze [Tribunal of Florence], Ordinance No 84, 21 January 2014, reported in 
Florence, Gazzetta Ufficiale 1a Serie Speciale — Corte costituzionale, 28 May 2014, 82–91; 
Tribunale di Firenze [Tribunal of Florence], Ordinance No 85, 21 January 2014, reported in 
Florence, Gazzetta Ufficiale 1a Serie Speciale — Corte costituzionale, 28 May 2014,  
91–101; Tribunale di Firenze [Tribunal of Florence], Ordinance No 113, 21 January 2014 
reported in Florence, Gazzetta Ufficiale 1a Serie Speciale — Corte costituzionale, 9 July 
2014, 43–52. 
 23 On the Italian model of judicial review, see generally Tania Groppi, ‘The Italian 
Constitutional Court: Towards a “Multilevel System” of Constitutional Review?’ (2008) 3 
Journal of Comparative Law 100. 
 24 On the origin and development of the state immunity customary rule, see Rolando Quadri, 
La giurisdizione sugli Stati stranieri (Giuffrè, 1941), reprinted in Rolando Quadri, Scritti 
giuridici (Giuffrè, 1988) vol 1, 239; Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional 
Immunities of Foreign States’ (1951) 28 British Yearbook of International Law 220; 
Riccardo Luzzatto, Stati stranieri e giurisdizione nazionale (Giuffrè, 1972); Sompsong 
Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National Authorities’ (1976-I) 149 
Recueil des cours 87; Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, Les immunités des Etats en droit 
international (Bruylant, 1997); Natalino Ronzitti and Gabriella Venturini (eds), Le immunità 
giurisdizionali degli stati e degli altri enti internazionali (CEDAM, 2008); Lanciotti and 
Panetta, above n 19; Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2013). 
 25 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Italian Constitution] art 10(1) [author’s trans]. In 
Italian, art 10(1) states: ‘L’ordinamento italiano si conforma alle norme internazionali 
generalmente riconosciute’. 
 26 See Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 15, 29 January 1996; Corte 
costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 348, 22 October 2007; Corte costituzionale 
[Italian Constitutional Court], No 349, 22 October 2007. See also Tullio Treves, Diritto 
internazionale: Problemi fondamentali (Giuffrè, 2005) 660–1. Previously, Luigi Condorelli 
had interpreted the article restrictively, stating that only the customary rules about which 
there was no doubt in the international community were dealt with in art 10(1). See Luigi 
Condorelli, ‘Il “riconoscimento generale” delle consuetudini internazionali nella 
Costituzione italiana’ (1979) 62 Rivista di diritto internazionale 4. By contrast, Rolando 
Quadri would take a more expansive interpretation, due to the fact that the clause pacta sunt 
servanda, the basis of the binding character of treaties, is a customary principle. Following 
his opinion, art 10(1) could also be applied to international treaties. See Rolando Quadri, 
Diritto Internazionale Pubblico (Liguori, 5th ed, 1968) 64–8.  
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According to art 10(1), the entire Italian legal system, including the 
Constitution, must conform to general international law.27 Consequently, in the 
Court’s past jurisprudence, it affirmed that an ordinary law in conflict with an 
international customary rule is void and that international customary norms 
prevail also over the Italian Constitution, except for the fundamental principles 
stated therein.28 
In the present case, the Court asserted that the right of access to justice is a 
fundamental human right. The Court also stated that, founded on arts 2 and 24 of 
the Italian Constitution, this right represents the cornerstone of human rights 
protection, because only through access to an independent judge can all other 
rights be effectively protected: 
This Court has repeatedly observed that the fundamental principles of the 
constitutional order include the right to appear and to be defended before a court 
of law in order to protect one’s rights guaranteed by Article 24, ie the right to a 
judge. This is especially true when the right at issue is invoked to protect 
fundamental human rights. 
 In the present case, the referring judge aptly indicated Articles 2 and 24 of the 
Constitution as inseparably tied together in the review of constitutionality 
required of this Court. The first [Article 2] is the substantive provision, in the 
fundamental principles of the Constitutional Charter, that safeguards the 
inviolability of fundamental human rights, including — this is crucial in the 
present case — human dignity. The second [Article 24] is a safeguard of human 
dignity as well, as it protects the right of access to justice for individuals in order 
to invoke their inviolable right[s].  
Although they belong to different fields, the substantial and the procedural, the 
two provisions share a common relevance in matters of constitutional 
compatibility of the norm of immunity of States from the civil jurisdiction of other 
States. It would indeed be difficult to identify how much is left of a right if it 
cannot be invoked before a judge in order to obtain effective protection.29 
For this reason, the international rule on state immunity cannot prevail sic et 
simpliciter over the individual right of access to justice. In the Court’s view, a 
‘balancing’ between state immunity and access to justice is theoretically 
possible.30 The former could prevail, but only if the acts that are the subject of a 
specific trial are typical sovereign acts and thus protected by the state immunity 
                                                 
 27 See Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 73, 22 March 2001. See also 
Antonio La Pergola, Costituzione e adattamento dell’ordinamento interno al diritto 
internazionale (Giuffrè, 1961) 292; Luigi Sico, ‘Adattamento del diritto interno al diritto 
internazionale generale’ in Giuffrè (ed), Enciclopedia del diritto: Aggiornamento II 
(Giuffrè, 1998) 32, 38; Beatrice I Bonafè, ‘Adattamento del diritto interno al diritto 
internazionale’ in Sabino Cassese and Mauro Catenacci (eds), Dizionario di diritto pubblico 
(Giuffrè, 2006) vol 1, 98, 101; Enzo Cannizzaro, Corso di diritto internazionale (Giuffrè, 
2011) 458; Andrea Gioia, Manuale breve: Diritto internazionale (Giuffrè, 4th ed, 2013) 473. 
According to Antonio Cassese, whose opinion differed, the status of an international 
customary norm in the Italian legal system could change depending on its subject. See 
Antonio Cassese, ‘Art 10’ in Giuseppe Branca (ed), Commentario della Costituzione: 
Principi fondamentali (Zanichelli, 1975) 485. 
 28 Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 48, 18 June 1979, [3]. 
 29 See Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 238, 22 October 2014, [3.4] 
(emphasis added). 
 30 Ibid [3.1]. 
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rule. However, in the past, the Court has declared the prevalence of a similar  
rule — diplomatic immunity — over the right of access to justice, on the basis 
that diplomatic immunity is strictly related to the sovereignty of a foreign state 
and functions directly to maintain peaceful relations in the international 
community.31 
On the contrary, according to the Court in the present case, state immunity 
cannot prevail over access to justice because the facts at the centre of similar 
trials are international crimes. In these cases, Italian judges do not face a 
sovereign state’s legitimate acts, which are typically protected by state immunity, 
but rather heinous international crimes that are unequivocally condemned by the 
international community and that are not an exercise of legitimate sovereign 
powers: 
In the present case, the customary international norm of immunity of foreign 
States, defined in its scope by the ICJ, entails the absolute sacrifice of the right to 
judicial protection, insofar as it denies the jurisdiction of [domestic] courts to 
adjudicate the action for damages put forward by victims of crimes against 
humanity and gross violations of fundamental human rights. This has been 
acknowledged by the ICJ itself, which referred the solution to this issue, on the 
international plane, to the opening of new negotiations, diplomatic means being 
considered the only appropriate method (para 102, Judgment of 3 February 2012).  
Moreover, in the constitutional order, a prevailing public interest that may justify 
the sacrifice of the right to judicial protection of fundamental rights (Articles 2 
and 24 Constitution), impaired as they were by serious crimes, cannot be 
identified.  
Immunity from jurisdiction of other States can be considered tenable from a legal 
standpoint, and even more so from a logical standpoint, and thus can justify on 
the constitutional plane the sacrifice of the principle of judicial protection of 
inviolable rights guaranteed by the Constitution, only when it is  
connected — substantially and not just formally — to the sovereign functions of 
the foreign State, ie with the exercise of its governmental powers.32 
In other words, the Court recognises that state immunity can be invoked only 
as an instrument to protect a legitimate state function, not as a shield that covers 
all the acta iure imperii. For this reason, the Court cannot declare that state 
immunity prevails over the fundamental right of access to justice, nor can it 
make a ‘balancing’ between the two rights.33 In similar cases, the Court can only 
declare that the Italian legal system does not implement the international 
customary law. 
                                                 
 31 Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 48, 18 June 1979, [3]. 
 32 Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 238, 22 October 2014, [3.4] 
(emphasis added). 
 33 For some critical remarks on this point, see Pasquale De Sena, ‘Norme internazionali 
generali e principi costituzionali fondamentali, fra giudice costituzionale e giudice comune 
(ancora sulla sentenza 238/2014)’ on Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale, SIDIBlog (17 
November 2014) <http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1186>. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court does not find that the international norm 
is unconstitutional. According to a dualist vision,34 international norms are not 
strictly part of the domestic system, and thus a domestic court is prevented from 
invalidating them. Therefore the Court affirms that art 10(1) does not function 
with respect to state immunity when an international crime is at the centre of a 
trial.35 The state immunity rule, in these cases, simply does not exist in the 
Italian legal system.36 
IV THE DUTY TO COMPLY WITH ICJ DECISIONS AND THE ITALIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGMENT 
Having decided that the state immunity rule does not exist in the Italian legal 
system if invoked in trials about the civil consequences of international crimes, 
the Court addressed the problem of the binding character of the ICJ’s judgment. 
First of all, it is necessary to emphasise that the ICJ’s decision in the 
Jurisdictional Immunities case is binding for only Italy because Italy was party to 
the proceeding. In other circumstances, Italian organs, including Italian courts, 
could have interpreted and applied general international customary law freely, 
not being formally bound by ICJ precedent.37 Although ICJ jurisprudence is 
authoritative and states are prone to spontaneously follow its findings and 
opinions,38 as demonstrated by the fact that the ruling in the Jurisdictional 
Immunities case affected the jurisprudence of many international and domestic 
courts,39 it should be noted that, strictly speaking, only states that are parties to a 
specific proceeding are bound to implement judgments of the ICJ, as affirmed by 
art 94 of the UN Charter and art 59 of the Statute of the International Court of 
                                                 
 34 The Italian Constitutional Court’s (‘the Court’) judgment is affected by a strong dualistic 
approach: Robert Kolb, ‘The Relationship between the International and Municipal Legal 
Order: Reflections on the Decision No 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court’ [2014] 
Questions of International Law, Zoom Out II, 5 <http://www.qil-qdi.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/12/02_Constitutional-Court-238-2014_KOLB.pdf>. 
 35 See Giusi Sorrenti, ‘La conformità dell’ordinamento italiano alle “norme di diritto 
internazionale generalmente riconosciute” e il giudizio di costituzionalità delle leggi’ in 
Giovanni Pitruzzella, Francesco Teresi and Giuseppe Verde (eds), Il parametro nel giudizio 
di costituzionalità: Atti del Seminario di Palermo, 28–29 maggio 1998 (Giappichelli, 2000) 
601, 630; Conforti, Diritto internazionale, above n 21, 348. 
 36 See Marco Longobardo, ‘“Il non-essere non è e non può essere”: brevi note a margine della 
sentenza n 238/2014 della Corte costituzionale rispetto all’adattamento dell’ordinamento 
italiano al diritto internazionale consuetudinario’ on Società Italiana di Diritto 
Internazionale, SIDIBlog (10 November 2014) <http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1124>. 
 37 On the role of the domestic jurisprudence in the application and reconnaissance of 
international customary law, see Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the 
Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts’ (1993) 4 
European Journal of International Law 159; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The 
Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102 American 
Journal of International Law 241; Benedetto Conforti, ‘Qualche riflessione sul contributo 
dei giudici internazionali ed interni al diritto internazionale’ in Gabriella Venturini and 
Stefania Bariatti (eds), Liber Fausto Pocar: Diritto Individuali e Giustizia Internazionale 
(Giuffrè, 2009) vol 1, 217; Anthea Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of 
National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (2011) 60 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 57. 
 38 This point was stressed also by the Court. See Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional 
Court], No 238, 22 October 2014, [3.1]. 
 39 See above n 19 and accompanying text. 
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Justice (‘ICJ Statute’).40 Therefore, the legal obligation to respect German 
immunity in cases similar to Ferrini flows only from these provisions. 
This problem was foremost in the mind of the Italian Constitutional Court 
judges and therefore the judgment deals with Italian participation in the United 
Nations, in order to neutralise the effects of the ICJ’s decision. 
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution grants a constitutional status to Italy’s 
membership of the UN. According to art 11,  
Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of 
sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice 
among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international organisations 
furthering such ends.41  
The drafters of the Italian Constitution wrote these lines with Italy’s UN 
membership in mind, in order to provide that the Italian legal system could 
adhere wholly to the utmost expression of international cooperation.42 Thanks to 
art 11, interpreted from a functional perspective, UN membership has a 
constitutional status in the Italian domestic system. This constitutional status is 
also accorded to Italy’s participation in other international organisations with 
similar goals, such as the European Union.43 For this reason, the Court has so far 
granted to EU Acts (such as regulations and directives) a status superior to 
ordinary law, while also stating that they cannot violate the fundamental 
principles of the Italian Constitution related to the protection of inviolable 
human rights.44 
It is undeniable that the ICJ is a UN body, and therefore the ICJ’s decisions 
would seem to fall into the sphere of art 11.45 Accordingly, even considering the 
ICJ’s decisions in proceedings to which Italy is a party, covered by art 11, and 
                                                 
 40 See Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau and Alain Pellet, Droit international public (LGDJ, 8th 
ed, 2009) 1005; Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘Article 94 UN Charter’, in Andreas Zimmermann et 
al (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 
2012) 186, 192; Robert Kolb, La Cour internationale de Justice (Pedone, 2014) 785. 
 41 Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Italian Constitution] art 11 [author’s trans]. The 
original text of art 11 states: 
L’Italia ripudia la guerra come strumento di offesa alla libertà degli altri popoli e 
come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie internazionali; consente, in condizioni 
di parità con gli altri Stati, alle limitazioni di sovranità necessarie ad un ordinamento 
che assicuri la pace e la giustizia fra le Nazioni; promuove e favorisce le 
organizzazioni internazionali rivolte a tale scopo. 
 42 See generally Enzo Cannizzaro, Trattati internazionali e giudizio di costituzionalità 
(Giuffrè, 1991) 293; Natalino Ronzitti (ed), L’articolo 11 della Costituzione: Baluardo della 
vocazione internazionalistica dell’Italia (Editoriale Scientifica, 2013). 
 43 See Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 14, 24 February 1964, [6]; Corte 
costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 183, 18 December 1973, [3]–[5]; Corte 
costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 170, 5 June 1984, [3]. See also Giorgio 
Gaja and Adelina Adinolfi, Introduzione al diritto dell’Unione Europea (Laterza, 2nd ed, 
2012) 197; Gian Luigi Tosato, ‘L’articolo 11 della Costituzione e il diritto dell’Unione 
Europea’ in Natalino Ronzitti (ed), L’articolo 11 della Costituzione: Baluardo della 
vocazione internazionale dell’Italia (Editoriale Scientifica, 2013) 69. 
 44 See Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 183, 18 December 1973, [9]. The 
Court clearly states that, in case of a contrast between an EU norm and the fundamental 
principles enshrined in the Constitution, the Court has to declare unconstitutional the law of 
execution of the EU treaties, only so far as it concerns the binding character of the specific 
EU norm in contrast with the said supreme principles. 
 45 Corte costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No 238, 22 October 2014, [41]. 
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therefore stronger than ordinary laws, the Court can neutralise their effects when 
in conflict with a supreme principle such as access to justice. In the recent 
judgment, pursuant to this doctrine, the Court declared that the ICJ’s decision 
about state immunity violates victims’ right of access to justice, and therefore 
cannot take effect in the Italian domestic system. It is clear that the Court could 
not invalidate a decision of the ICJ, but it could declare art 1 of Law 
No 848/1957 partially unconstitutional insofar as it requires Italy to comply with 
the Jurisdictional Immunities decision, without any prejudice to Italy’s 
commitments under the UN Charter at large.46 
On this point, it could be observed that the Court simply applied the system 
envisaged in the case of a conflict between an EU norm, also within the scope of 
art 11, and a fundamental principle of the Italian Constitution. Again, the Court 
intervened to alter the mechanism of implementation of the UN  
Charter — which is obviously a domestic act, over which the Court has full 
jurisdiction — and not to alter the external norm. 
Lastly, the Court declared unconstitutional and therefore null and void art 3 of 
Law No 5/2013, which is an entirely domestic law meant to specify the 
obligations arising from art 94 of the UN Charter.47 
It is important to stress that the decision of the Court affects the relationship 
between Italy and the UN only superficially. All the duties assumed by Italy 
through its UN membership are still in place, as is the obligation to comply with 
ICJ decisions in proceedings to which Italy is a party: 
In any other case, it is certainly clear that the undertaking of the Italian State to 
respect all of the international obligations imposed by the accession to the United 
Nations Charter, including the duty to comply with the judgments of the ICJ, 
remains unchanged ... The remainder of the Law of Adaptation No 848/1957 
continues to be indisputably in full force and effect.48 
The Court has only barred the binding character of the Jurisdictional 
Immunities decision, noting that it cannot be held part of the Italian legal system 
due to its entire disregard of the right of access to justice for the victims of Nazi 
crimes. 
V AN EVALUATION OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
The decision of the Court is clearly an important judgment at the international 
level, and therefore must be evaluated as a relevant manifestation of state 
practice with respect to the non-existence of state immunity when international 
crimes are the object of a domestic trial. The Court correctly states that its 
decision could influence the development of general international law on this 
point, perhaps inverting the course of the most recent domestic and international 
                                                 
 46 Ibid dispositif [2]. 
 47 Ibid dispositif [3]. 
 48 Ibid [4.1]. 
12 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 16 
 
jurisprudence, which has tended to accept the ICJ’s decisions.49 In truth, the ICJ 
affirmed, after a not wholly convincing review of state practice,50 that its 
decision regarded only international law as it presently stands,51 clearly 
implying that state practice could, in future, modify this rule. The present 
decision could play a role in this process of modification if it is considered to be 
not merely a judgment on the relationship between the international and 
domestic legal order, but a general challenge to the existence of state immunity 
in suits arising out of international crimes. 
It is important to note that the Court tries to avoid referring to the peremptory 
character of either access to justice or the duty not to commit international 
crimes. In doing so, the Court seems to distance its position from both the 
decisions passed by the Supreme Court and the strategy of the Italian defence in 
the Jurisdictional Immunities case.52 The Court could have ruled that the duty 
not to commit international crimes is jus cogens at an international level and, 
therefore, has a higher status in the domestic legal system through art 10(1), as 
has been suggested.53 However, the Court decided on a different course of 
action, relying instead on the tools provided by the domestic legal system, and 
above all the Italian Constitution, in order not to replace — or worse,  
rewrite — the ICJ’s judgment. 
From the Court’s perspective, the decision was not about the victims’ right to 
reparation — a very delicate and slippery subject in contemporary international 
law.54 The ICJ, ruling on the relation between state immunity and reparation, has 
indicated that Germany and Italy should have found an equivalent solution 
                                                 
 49 Ibid [3.3]. For a comment, see Pasquale De Sena, ‘The Judgment of the Italian 
Constitutional Court on State Immunity in Cases of Serious Violations of Human Rights or 
Humanitarian Law: A Tentative Analysis under International Law’ (2014) Questions of 
International Law, Zoom out II, 17, 26–7 <http://www.qil-qdi.org/judgment-italian 
-constitutional-court-state-immunity-cases-serious-violations-human-rights-humanitarian 
-law-tentative-analysis-international-law>. 
 50 Jurisdictional Immunities [2012] ICJ Rep 100, 309 (Judge ad hoc Gaja). See also Gradoni 
and Tanzi, ‘Immunità dello Stato e crimini internazionali tra consuetudine e bilanciamento’, 
above n 2, 211–19. For a survey of the international and national jurisprudence that denies 
state immunity when the damages caused by international crimes are the object of a civil 
proceeding, see Lanciotti and Panetta, above n 19; Elena Sciso, ‘Italian Judges’ Point of 
View on Foreign States’ Immunity’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
1201. 
 51 Jurisdictional Immunities [2012] ICJ Rep 100, 139 [91]. 
 52 For some critical remarks about the reasoning of the Italian Supreme Court on this point, see 
Carlo Focarelli, ‘Diniego dell’immunità alla Germania per crimini internazionali: la 
Suprema Corte si fonda su valutazioni “qualitative”’ (2009) 92 Rivista di diritto 
internazionale 363. 
 53 See Natalino Ronzitti, ‘L’adattamento dell’ordinamento italiano alle norme imperative del 
diritto internazionale’ in Andrea Giardina and Flavia Lattanzi (eds), Studi di diritto 
internazionale in onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (Editoriale Scientifica, 2004) vol 1, 633, 
635. 
 54 See International Law Association, ‘Resolution No 2/2010 — Reparation for Victims of 
Armed Conflict’ (15–20 August 2010); International Law Association, ‘Resolution 1/2014 
— Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’ (7–11 April 2014). See also Andrea Gattini, 
Le riparazioni di guerra nel diritto internazionale (CEDAM, 2003); Emanuela-Chiara 
Gillard, ‘Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross 529; Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan 
Stephens (eds), Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). 
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through diplomatic negotiations,55 but so far there has been no sign of any 
serious intention of these two countries to find some effective form of reparation. 
In fact, the Court could not have decided on an alternative form of satisfaction:56 
access to justice can be achieved only through the ability of the victims to start a 
proceeding before an independent judge. There is no other way — no alternative. 
Even a monetary sum would not be a suitable substitute for access to justice, but 
only a subsequent form of reparation, which is separate from the fundamental 
right itself. 
On this point, the author shares the opinion of the drafter of this historical 
decision, the former President of the Court, Professor Giuseppe Tesauro, who 
affirmed that the Court could not have decided otherwise.57 
On the other hand, the decision raises some critical issues. First of all, the 
request of the Tribunal of Florence concerned only the giurisdizione civile di 
cognizione [civil jurisdiction], affirming openly that there is no doubt about the 
subsistence of the international rule of state immunity in the giurisdizione civile 
di esecuzione [enforcement of domestic judgments]: 
Finally, in the present judge’s opinion, the issue of constitutionality concerns only 
the civil jurisdiction of this Tribunal, the sole jurisdictional matter relevant for 
this specific case, and therefore the doubts of constitutionality are referred [to the 
Constitutional Court] only within this limited scope. In accordance with the text 
of the aforementioned New York convention, already ratified by Italy with Article 
2 of the Law No 5/2013, there is room to argue that, on one hand, Article 24 of the 
Italian Constitution does not allow any obstacles to the justiciability and the 
condemnation of such serious acts, but on the other it demands that the 
enforcement of such decisions will be prevented, because such enforcement 
would be an illicit infringement of other States’ sovereignty, in light of the values 
at the basis of international customary norms not in conflict with the 
Constitution.58 
In other words, the Tribunal of Florence requested a judgment from the Court 
on the jurisdiction of an Italian tribunal to judge whether Germany is responsible 
today for international crimes committed by its army against Italian citizens 
decades ago. The request never suggested that, in the case of a favourable 
                                                 
   55 Jurisdictional Immunities [2012] ICJ Rep 100, 144 [104]:  
In coming to this conclusion, the Court is not unaware that the immunity from 
jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with international law may preclude judicial 
redress for the Italian nationals concerned. It considers however that the claims 
arising from the treatment of the Italian military internees referred to in paragraph 99, 
together with other claims of Italian nationals which have allegedly not been  
settled — and which formed the basis for the Italian proceedings — could be the 
subject of further negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a view to 
resolving the issue.  
For a comment, see Nesi, above n 13, 196–7. 
 56 For alternative solutions envisaged before the Court’s decision, see Deborah Russo, ‘Il 
rapporto tra norme internazionali generali e principi della Costituzione al vaglio della Corte 
Costituzionale: il Tribunale di Firenze rinvia alla Consulta la questione delle vittime dei 
crimini nazisti’ [2014] Osservatorio sulle fonti 1, 11 <http://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/ 
component/docman/doc_download/690-osf12014russo>. 
 57 Giuseppe Tesauro (Speech delivered at the ‘Crimini internazionali e immunità degli Stati: 
ritorno al dualismo?’ Conference, Università di Roma, Rome, 12 November 2014). 
 58 Tribunale di Firenze [Tribunal of Florence], Ordinance No 84, 21 January 2014 [author’s 
trans]. 
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judgment, the next of kin of those victims could expropriate German goods in 
order to concretely satisfy their award. The Constitutional Court’s response, 
therefore, concerns exclusively the civil jurisdiction, the power of a judge to 
examine a question in order to assert who is responsible for what, not the actual 
possibility of enforcing the judgment and getting reparation.59 Due to the 
sensitivity of this subject, the Court could have more clearly emphasised this 
point; a common Italian judge, after this judgment, could decide to apply the 
reasoning of the Court at the phase of the implementation of a judgment in the 
victims’ favour, violating German property rights in Italy. On the other hand, the 
same judge could be more cautious, requesting another judgment from the Court 
about the executive jurisdiction; in this case, the Court would face a difficult 
dilemma over whether to mount the utmost defence of the rights of the human 
being and challenge the sovereign immunity of German property in Italy.60 
Secondly, the Court could have tried to ‘balance’ the right of access to justice 
with the duty to comply with an international decision, not because it was passed 
by a UN organ, but because it was the result of a peaceful attempt to settle an 
international dispute. The first part of art 11 of the Italian Constitution states that 
‘Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other 
peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes’. Accordingly, 
Italy is bound to follow peaceful means to settle controversies with other states61 
and, possibly, is under an autonomous obligation to implement the accord or the 
judgment that resolves the dispute. From this perspective, the first part of art 11 
could have been used as the material basis upon which the Court could have 
‘balanced’ access to justice with Italy’s desire to safeguard friendly and peaceful 
relations among states.62 In doing so, the Court would have avoided ‘balancing’ 
state immunity in the case of international crimes and fundamental rights; 
instead, it could have ruled on the relationship between two supreme principles, 
the individual right of access to justice and the commitment to resolve 
international disputes in the proper, peaceful way. Perhaps this ‘balancing’ 
would have resulted in the right of access to justice prevailing in any case. 
However, the Court should have tried to pursue this avenue, rather than rushing 
                                                 
 59 For a definition of ‘enforcement’, see European Commission Directorate General for Justice 
and Consumers, Glossary (16 July 2013) <ec.europa.eu/justice/glossary/>:  
The enforcement of a judgment consists of securing compliance with it, if necessary 
by means of coercion as allowed by the law, including the intervention of the forces 
of law and order. If you win your case in the courts but the other side does not 
spontaneously comply with the court’s order, you can go to the police or a bailiff, 
depending on the situation, to have the judgment carried out.  
 60 See Longobardo, above n 36. For Attila Tanzi, the immunity from the enforcement of a 
victorious civil judgment appears to be a ‘nearly unassailable stronghold’: Attila Tanzi, 
‘Sulla sentenza Cost 238/2014: cui prodest?’ (2014) Forum di  
Quaderni Costituzionali Rassegna, [4] <http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/12/nota_238_2014_tanzi.pdf>. 
 61 See Antonio Cassese, ‘Art 11’ in Giuseppe Branca (ed), Commentario della Costituzione: 
Principi fondamentali (Zanichelli, 1975) 565, 575. On the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes, see generally Tullio Treves, Le controversie internazionali: Nuove 
tendenze, nuovi tribunali (Giuffrè, 1999); Alain Pellet, ‘Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum et al (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) vol 8, 201.  
 62 For the material character of the first part of art 11, see Cannizzaro, Trattati internazionali e 
giudizio di costituzionalità, above n 42, 299. 
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to carve out an exception to state immunity, thereby creating a conflict between 
domestic and international law.63 
VI CONCLUSION 
The Court, in passing its historical judgment about state immunity and 
individual access to justice, primarily protected the fundamental right of the 
victim’s next of kin. It stated that Italian tribunals have jurisdiction in these 
cases, because the rule on state immunity has no legal effect in the Italian legal 
system where international crimes have occurred. Accordingly, Italian judges 
must disregard the Jurisdictional Immunities decision and civil proceedings may 
take place. Regarding the separation of international law and the domestic legal 
system, the Court has courageously stated that state immunity is no longer a 
shield for states that perpetrated international crimes. 
As previously mentioned, the present decision exposes Italy to international 
responsibility and other risks at the international level, such as a new ICJ 
proceeding and/or an intervention of the UN Security Council, although this does 
not appear to be likely. In the meantime, the Italian Government should 
withdraw its interpretative declaration to the UN State Immunity Convention, in 
order to align its position with the Court’s decision.64 
It is the opinion of this author that this decision will influence the future 
approach of international and domestic courts to the state immunity rule and the 
ICJ’s decision on the matter. Auspiciously, this decision will strengthen the so 
far minority jurisprudence of certain domestic courts that has, even after the 
Jurisdictional Immunities case, stressed that state immunity cannot be invoked to 
refuse victims of international crimes their right to seek justice and reparation.65 
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